By David O. Brink
David verge of collapse provides a learn of T. H. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics (1883), a vintage of British idealism. eco-friendly develops a perfectionist moral idea that brings jointly the simplest components within the historical and sleek traditions and that offers the ethical foundations for Green's personal influential model of liberalism. Brink's ebook situates the Prolegomena in its highbrow context, examines its major topics, and explains Green's enduring value for the heritage of ethics and modern moral thought.
Read Online or Download Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green (Lines of Thought) PDF
Best political books
Is it attainable to harness some great benefits of fiscal globalization with out sacrificing social fairness, ecological sustainability, and democratic governance? the 1st version of Civilizing Globalization (2003) explored this query at a time of frequent renowned discontent. This totally revised and improved variation comes at an both an important juncture.
Analyzes the industrial, social, political and environmental implications of NAFTA from a number severe views. The chapters, unified via a sceptical view of the administration of financial integration in North the US disguise the industrial technique of Mexico, Canada-US alternate contract and extra.
Extra resources for Perfectionism and the Common Good: Themes in the Philosophy of T. H. Green (Lines of Thought)
Green identifies the will with the motive and suggests that the will is a kind of desire. This suggests that the will is a desire that is the product of the right sort of deliberative endorsement. This still allows us to recognize strength of will, because the sense in which desires that are the product of deliberative endorsement are strongest is not the same sense of strength in which some pre-deliberative desires are stronger or more intense than others. This account also allows us to recognize weakness of will.
Self-Consciousness and Practical Responsibility ~ 23 kinds of strength, he thinks, that one could see a threat to responsibility here. Another way to put Green’s point is this. The claim that one must act according to one’s strongest desire either (a) associates strength of desire with its felt intensity or (b) associates it with whatever desires move one to act after due deliberation. On the (a)-reading, the alleged necessity of acting on one’s strongest desires would threaten responsibility but is false; whereas, on the (b)-reading, the alleged necessity is perhaps true, but no threat to responsibility.
As such, it is reasonable for him to will something not just as a good, but as what is best for him to do. Nor is the inference from good to good for the agent as problematic as might first appear. For one thing, Green explicitly allows that a person’s conception of his own good may require self-sacrifice. By an instinctive action we mean one not determined by a conception, on the part of the agent, of any good to be gained or evil to be avoided by the action. It is superfluous to add, good to himself, for anything conceived of as good in such a way that the agent acts for the sake of it, must be conceived as his own good, though he may conceive it as his own good only on account of his interest in others, and in spite of any suffering on his own part incidental to its attainment.